Introduction

1.
How does the rule of law respond -for undoubtedly it must respond -where the State designs mechanisms of "civil" constraints upon individual liberty, intended to avoid perceived obstacles associated with basic "criminal" process? Take the response to terrorism. Here is a proposition:
The rule of law requires that an individual's basic freedoms be subjected to ongoing constraints to protect the public against terrorist activity only if three basic protections are secured. There must be the right to: (i) a judicial determination; (ii) with proper transparency; and (iii) a finding of established-wrongdoing.
2.
Why should this proposition be accepted as correct? (1) Because such constraints are stigmatising and intrusive controls which call for appropriate minimum standards. (2) Because these are basic characteristics seen in the criminal process but which are so fundamental as to carry across to any "civil" classification, influencing basic fairness as a matter of process and substance. (3) Because they are not 'obstacles' so much as fundamental safeguards. (4) Because they should stand impervious to any labelling or design intended (including by Parliament) to avoid or dilute them. (5) Because it can be a distraction to ask whether what has been designed is a "criminal charge", needing to be so characterised so as to bring in all recognised features of the criminal law. (6) Because the obligations -express and implied, procedural and substantivefound in the European Convention on Human Rights (and the UK's Human Rights Act 1998) ought to be sufficient to achieve this position. (7) Because, to the extent that the HRA:ECHR cannot assist, constitutional protection under the rule of law should secure the same answer.
Three Fundamental Protections 3. "Criminal" law and "criminal" process are well-recognised as attracting a series of elaborate standards and safeguards, imposed for good reason. But at the very heart of an individual's experience of the criminal process, are to be found these three basic features. They will arise where the individual is facing constraints at the end of the process which would serve to deprive the individual of their liberty (incarceration), including where the duration of the deprivation of liberty includes a preventative rationale. They also arise where the individual is facing constraints which would operate to control liberty, falling short of incarceration (eg. a disqualification, registration, curfew, fine or confiscation of assets). For the features, at the very essence of the process, are: (i) as to who -the determination is made by an independent judicial tribunal; (ii) as to how -it is made by a transparent process; and (iii) as to what -it is based on established wrongdoing. The individual is found: (i) by a court; (ii) on a case openly ventilated; (iii) to have acted wrongly under the law. The rule of law secures the (i) judicial and (ii) transparent (iii) determination of wrongdoing. 11. Important problems are sought to be bypassed. They can involve questions of substance. Take the test of "reasonable suspicion". It is familiar that even the individual facing constraining measures under the criminal law may be acted against on the grounds of reasonable suspicion: an arrest; a house search; remand. This is the familiar test from ECHR Article 5(1)(c) addressed in Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 157 §32, and described in the context of antiterrorism control orders in MB CA at §59. There is, however, a vitally important qualification. These steps, including incarceration under Article 5(1)(c), are interim measures on the path to a judicialised and transparent establishment of wrongdoing. Far from being a point of parallel comforting the Court of Appeal as to the permissibility of an approach to control orders based on reasonable suspicion, Fox, Campbell and Hartley and Article 5(1)(c) ought to have served as an alarming point of contrast, calling into serious question the use of reasonable suspicion to justify intrusive final measures.
12. They can involve questions of purpose. Take "preventative purposes". There can be preventative elements in criminal sanctions, including a sentence of imprisonment. A confiscation order imposed by a sentencing court, for example, may in part be intended to remove the means for future criminal conduct. But the criminal law does not, cannot, step in purely to prevent future crime, however serious. Even civil injunctions in support of the criminal law arise out of previous criminal conduct. The position as to the deprivation of liberty is instructive: it is a cardinal feature of the rule of law (reflected in HRA:ECHR Article 5) that detention cannot be imposed by the State for purely preventative reasons. That is internment. It is impermissible. Thus, for the State to say that it is acting for a special reason -with a preventative purpose -is not an excusing virtue but a disqualifying vice. This brings into sharp focus this question: to what extent can the State expect to be able to invoke a 'preventative purpose' to avoid or dilute fundamental safeguards, where the control falls short of deprivation of liberty. That is of course precisely the location on the legal map where non-derogating control orders fell.
Engel Classification
13. The rule of law maintains its bedrock protections in the face of cleverly designed 'civil' constraints using two different techniques. They each involve putting essence (or 'substance') above label. The first technique involves applying criminal due process standards to a so-called 'civil' constraint by holding that its essence requires that it be recharacterised as involving a "criminal charge" (or "criminal penalty") . This is an antiavoidance principle, which prevents "criminal" accusations and penalties from being labelled as civil so as to avoid the standards of the criminal law. In ECHR terms it operates under the so-called criteria of the Engel line of cases (Engel at §82), considering (a) domestic classification (b) nature and purpose and (c) severity of sanction.
This technique was the principle which caused the controversy in International Transport Roth GmbH v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 258
[2003] QB 728. That was the case which concerned the fixed carrier penalty scheme under s.32 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, involving fixed penalties and the impounding of vehicles, adopted in the face of the flow of clandestine entrants into the UK. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, held that the scheme was properly to be characterised as "criminal", and applied the criminal safeguards in ECHR Article 6 (including the presumption of innocence in Article 6(2)) in deciding whether the scheme was lawful. It was not.
15. The Engel classification solution has not proved satisfactory as the answer to Professor Ashworth's challenge. It involves two major problems. First, it is an 'all-ornothing' line which brings the full range of criminal due process standards. Secondly, it has come to fixate on penalty and penalisation, and to treat executive preventative constraints as having a purpose which is their excusing virtue. That is odd and unsatisfactory. In the context of deprivation of liberty (Article 5), constraints which are purely preventative in their purpose (ie. internment) have for that reason a disqualifying vice. Yet in the context of other "devastating" controls on individual liberty, action taken preventatively is for that reason permitted to bypass the standards of the criminal law. This deserves a fresh look, though the first problem -the 'all or nothing' nature of classification-based principles -would remain. There is a more nuanced way.
Transcendental Protections
16. Happily, there is another way. The second technique is more tailored. It involves applying appropriate criminal protections even in an admittedly non-criminal case, where the rule of law so requires in order to secure fairness and proportionality context of the case in question. This means looking at the 'essence' of the matter and the standards for which it calls, beyond the classification of "criminal" or "civil", and beyond even the question of what is classified as "procedure" and what as "substance". For fundamental protections can 'transcend' issues of classification, to achieve what in the relevant context is the requisite measure of procedural and substantive justice. This is the more promising way for the rule of law to secure appropriate protection and guard against civil constraints which 'cheat' on the criminal law. It takes in its stride, indeed weighs as an anxious concern, that a measure may be preventative in its purpose. This was an observation endorsed in the context of anti-terrorism control orders: see MB HL at §17 (Lord Bingham).
23. When standards come to be delineated in a "civil" context, one key question is whether they can nevertheless be located on the human rights map. Most obviously, they may be linked to the guarantee of due process (fair trial) in HRA:ECHR Article 6. For if the protection belongs rather to domestic common law, there is the problem of clear primary legislation which is designed and expressed to be incompatible with the relevant safeguard. Had, for example, the civil standard of proof been indicated on the face of the statutory schemes in B, Gough or McCann, ECHR Article 6 would have been relied on as to the strength of the protection and the remedial responses (interpretation under HRA s.3, or a declaration of incompatibility).
24. Beyond the protections of the HRA, there would be the common law principle of legality and constitutional protection of human rights and the rule of law. At the current state of evolution of the law in the United Kingdom, there are real differences which continue to matter. There are questions which will need more progressive answers than 'Parliament can legislate to exclude a basic protection, provided that it confronts the political cost'. For the present, it is to be hoped that the protections of the HRA:ECHR can sufficiently cover the necessary ground. And for that, it may be necessary to look beyond Article 6, with its procedural focus and restriction to a "determination of civil rights and obligations". The substantive Articles of the Convention may also need to find a voice.
25. It has been suggested that there are three most basic characteristics: (i) judicialisation, (ii) transparency and (iii) the establishment of wrongdoing. How have they fared in the context of "civil" controls which otherwise seek to overcome perceived 'obstacles' in the criminal law? It is immediately to be noted that each of these three basic safeguards was secured and respected in the line of civil restraint cases discussed above. Parliament did not dare to displace them. Mr B was entitled to a hearing before a court (magistrates), knowing the essence of the case against him, and with a determination of wrongdoing: that he had " 31. The strength, status and remedial effect of the common law constitutional principle are tested in contexts which lie beyond the boundaries of the "determination of a civil right or obligation". Suppose it is said (see Khaled) that an asset-freezing direction is a 'public function' with a dramatic impact on individual rights, rather than a "determination of civil rights and obligations". The law would expect the standard of minimum transparency to be the same at common law: hence the comments in Khaled at §8 and § §31-32 about whether the question of classification is one which should matter; surely the standards are the same. True, they must be. But the problem may be rather as to status and remedy. Absent the HRA remedial responses, the bedrock legal standard may be displaced by the statutory scheme, there being no scope for the s.3 fairness proviso or a declaration of incompatibility: see R (Bhutta) v HM Treasury [2011] EWHC 1789. These cases will need to get back on the rails of Article 6 (civil), or of similar implied standards of due process in other applicable Convention rights (notably Article 1P), or perhaps through the medium of the EU Charter (whose due process protection extends deliberately wider than Article 6). Failing those, there ought to be a fresh look at the constitutional implications of basic procedural fairness and whether it can always be displaced by primary legislation. If the right to a court can serve as a constitutional fundamental which cannot be excluded, then why not the basic right of natural justice?
(iii) Established-Wrongdoing 32. This third key component, the establishment of wrongdoing, has not fared so well. It has become the surrendered (or forgotten) feature in United Kingdom law. The law has been rightly anxious to respond to control orders and asset-freezing directions by emphasising the protections of judicialisation (the who) and transparency (the how 37. The difficulty is probably to be found in the distinction between matters of "process" and matters of "substance". In MB CA the Court of Appeal addressed the 'reasonable suspicion' basis for control orders and overturned Sullivan J's finding that establishedwrongdoing was a necessary safeguard in a fair system (see MB CA at §66). The Court accused Sullivan J of confusing substance and procedure ( §67), since Article 6 was concerned only with procedural fairness and not the fairness of a substantive criterion (see §36). Here, the substantive criterion was determined by the statute itself, albeit that as a matter of process Article 6 standards could be invoked to insist on a merits review whereby the reviewing Court would determine the relevant objective question (reasonable suspicion) for itself ( §60).
38. This strict delineation between fair process and fair substance is unattractive. A preferable approach is that which the Divisional Court took in the Roth case, recognising that matters of process and substance were inextricably linked, in asking whether the civil carrier penalty scheme was so draconian as to be unfair. Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 1P (property rights) were each in play, and were held to overlap (see § §30-31). The scheme was unfair as to the scale and inflexibility of what was imposed. The strict liability (absence of scope for mitigation) was a criterion of the statutory scheme, as was the fixed penalty (absence of judicial discretion). It was not necessary rigidly to separate out the process from the substance.
39. Insofar as it is appropriate to emphasise the distinction between substance and procedure, it does not follow that Sullivan J's concerns were unfounded. Rather, they may simply have been gathered under the wrong heading. Ultimately, one can put to one side the application -or otherwise -of the civil standards of Article 6. Control orders involve interferences with a range of substantive Convention rights, and assetfreezing directions are a plain and obvious interference with Article 1P. That brings into play the principles of necessity and proportionality, as a matter of substance and fair balance (substantively). Moreover -if it matters -the substantive Convention rights can carry implied procedural protections. The point resolves into a single question, which it is the responsibility of the Court -not the executive and not Parliament -to determine.
40. The question is this: is it truly necessary in a democratic society for stigmatising and intrusive controls on the liberty of the individual to be imposed on the basis of reasonable suspicion? The answer is no. What strikes the requisite fair balance is a scheme in which a court, and under a process respecting the core standard of fair disclosure, determines not suspected conduct but the conduct itself. 
Conclusion
43. This is a context in which the rule of law must be at its most resolute. Basic protections can 'transcend' questions of classification. The rule of law must look beyond labels and classifications of "criminal" and "civil" controls, and beyond concepts such as "determination of civil rights and obligations". It must embrace the linked questions of "procedure" and "substance". It must respond resolutely to, and not merely within, statutory frameworks even where deliberately designed to avoid or dilute such basic safeguards.
44. There are three basic protections, not two. The safeguards extend to substance, not merely procedure. The third basic feature -the right to established-wrongdoingshould be acknowledged, alongside the first two: the right to a Court and the right to minimum fair disclosure. In Roth the Divisional Court thought that a statutory scheme of carrier penalties was unfair and unjustified, in part because of the undemanding nature of the substantive criteria which were applied. In Gough the Court of Appeal thought that a statutory scheme of banning orders was fair and justified, in part because of the rigour which could be attached to the substantive criteria to be applied.
In MB Sullivan J held that the statutory scheme of control orders was unfair and unjustified because what was needed was a judicialised process with proper transparency and established-wrongdoing. He has been vindicated as to the need for a judicial determination involving proper transparency. But Sullivan J was also right about the need for established-wrongdoing.
45. The individual has the right, before intrusive and stigmatising restraints are imposed, to a process before a Court, with disclosure of the essence of the case against them, and a determination of whether they have actually done that of which the State suspects them. To fall short of this is to allow the State to operate an unfair system of control of individual civil liberties. It is to deny the individual out of the most essential characteristics of fairness, which transcend the criminal/civil distinction. It is to allow the State to cheat the criminal law.
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